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Abstract:  I agree with Marino (2017a,b) that the cognitive capacities of chickens are likely to be 
the same as those of many others vertebrates. Also, data collected in the young of this precocial 
species provide rich information about how much cognition can be pre-wired and predisposed in 
the brain. However, evidence of advanced cognition — in chickens or any other organism — says 
little about sentience (i.e., feeling). We do not deny sentience in human beings who, because of 
cognitive deficits, would be incapable of exhibiting some of the cognitive feats of chickens. 
Moreover, complex problem solving, such as transitive inference, which has been reported in 
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In a revealing piece in New Scientist (Lawler, 2015a) and a beautiful book (Lawler, 2015b), science 
journalist Andrew Lawler discussed the possible consequences for humans of the sudden 
disappearance of some domesticated species. If cats and dogs were to disappear tomorrow, it 
would be tragic for the owners of these most beloved creatures; if beef cattle disappeared, 
economic crisis could be expected in some countries (e.g., USA, Argentina). All of this would be 
upsetting on psychological and economic grounds, but plausibly we would survive. What about 
the disappearance of chickens because of, say, bird flu? Lawler argued convincingly that with the 
sudden disappearance of chickens, the human species could be in big trouble. There are an 
estimated 22 billion chickens in the world at present, providing one-third of the world’s meat 
supply. In Lawler’s words:  
 
“(…) For every person, three chickens are alive and clucking today. Humans gobble down almost 
100 million tonnes of chicken meat and over 1 trillion eggs annually.”  
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These numbers show how much chickens are exploited by humans: most exploited commercially 
and little respected cognitively. We must thus applaud Lori Marino’s (2017a,b) timely review of 
the mental capabilities of chickens.  
Actually, I totally agree with Marino that there is nothing special in chickens’ cognitive 
abilities: they are not different from those exhibited by others vertebrates. There is, however, 
something that I would like to add to Marino’s review, to reinforce her position but also to put 
research on chickens’ cognition in an historical perspective within ethology, comparative 
psychology and neurobiology.  
My brief historical note is just to show that an appreciation of chickens’ cognition was 
apparent in science, though admittedly sparse in the scientific literature, well before the recent 
important advances in our understanding of pallial evolution in the avian and mammalian brains 
(reviews in Jarvis, 2009; Güntürkün and Bugnyar, 2016). Clearly, however, these studies have not 
had an impact on a large audience, particularly non-specialists. They were aimed at specific 
scientific problems (e.g., memory, early knowledge, brain asymmetry). The role played by 
chickens, although crucial, appeared mostly instrumental. 
I would also like to comment on the kinds of conclusions we should draw about sentience 
from the evidence of advanced cognitive abilities for sentience in chickens and others creatures. 
 
1. The legacy of research on chick(ens) 
 
Even though comparative psychologists have for several (sometimes wrong) reasons, chosen rats 
and pigeons as the prototypical animal models among, respectively, mammals and birds, there 
has been (and still is) a tradition of research that instead favored the use of young chicks (and 
ducklings) to investigate various aspects of cognition and its brain bases.  
Young precocial nidifugous birds, such as ducklings and domestic chicks, were ideal species 
for the study of early learning, in particular imprinting (for reviews of the advantages of studying 
precocial species see Versace, 2017; Versace and Vallortigara, 2015). Douglas Spalding, the 
pioneer of ethology, first discovered imprinting in domestic chicks, dubbing it “imperfect instinct” 
(Spalding, 1873). Imprinting is still a very active area of research with important implications for 
the study of recognition memory and exposure learning (for recent reviews see Horn, 2004; 
McCabe, 2013). 
Associated with the phenomenon of imprinting are also the topics of sensitive periods and 
biological predispositions to imprinting (so-called “imprintability,” see also Bateson, 2011). 
Toshiya Matsushima and Koichi Homma in Japan (Yamaguchi et al., 2012) have recently provided 
an important breakthrough with evidence that sensitive periods in chicks can be re-opened by 
thyroid hormone T3 – a finding with deep implications also for human health (Yamaguchi et al., 
2012). Biological predispositions to attend to animated objects (and thus to imprint on them) 
have revealed surprising links with various aspects of early cognition in human newborns (review 
in Vallortigara, 2012a,b). Topics such as non-learned preferences for face-like stimuli (Johnson, 
2005; Johnson and Horn, 1988; Johnson and Morton, 1991; Rosa-Salva et al., 2010; 2011), 
biological motion (Vallortigara et al., 2005; Vallortigara and Regolin, 2006; Johnson, 2006; Rosa-
Salva et al., 2016; Versace et al., 2017a), causal agency (Mascalzoni et al., 2010), and acoustic 
consonant intervals (Chiandetti and Vallortigara, 2011a) in newly-hatched chicks have been 
guided by research on humans (reviews in Di Giorgio et al., 2016b; Rosa Salva et al., 2015) in a 
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complex interdisciplinary interplay between ethology (Versace et al., 2017), neurobiology 
(Lorenzi et al., 2017) and developmental psychology (Di Giorgio et al., 2017; Mascalzoni et al., 
2013; Simion et al., 2008). Such an interdisciplinary endeavor recently provided evidence that 
the absence of the predisposition to attend to the animacy cues revealed in chick research could 
be useful in early diagnosis of human neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism (Di Giorgio 
et al., 2016a). 
There is also another historical root to chicks’ cognition research, however, different from 
that of classical ethology and early learning. In Europe in the years between the two World wars, 
some zoologists and experimental psychologists in the new school of Gestalt psychology did 
innovative research on animal cognition. Several of them used chicks or adult chickens as 
subjects. For example, Kohler did research on relational (brightness) perception in chickens 
(reported in Werner, 1940), Ducker on optical illusions (Ducker, 1966), and Revesz (quoted in 
Katz, 1933) on number cognition. Mario Zanforlin — whom Marino mentions as the first scientist 
documenting the perception of Kanizsa’s subjective contours in chicks (Zanforlin, 1981) — 
belonged to this tradition, linking it with that of classical ethology via Aubrey Manning in 
Edinburgh. (I did the same, actually, combining my own original Gestalt background with Mario 
with British ethology and neurobiology thanks to the mentorship of Richard Andrew at Sussex 
University.)  
Such a tradition of comparative research on visual illusions and perceptual organization 
(e.g., Vallortigara and Tommasi, 2001; Forkman and Vallortigara, 1999), inspired by Gaetano 
Kanizsa himself (e.g., Kanizsa et al., 1993), is still alive in the universities of North-East of Italy 
such as Padua, Trento and Trieste, and uses chicks as one of its preferred models (see 
Vallortigara, 2004; 2006). There have been followers also in the US, particularly on  whether some 
perceptual phenomena, such as the perception of light-from-above, are learned or innate 
(Hershberger, 1970). This work continues today with interest in using chicks as model systems by 
perceptual psychologists such as Alan Gilchrist, who study perceptual constancy (Gilchrist et al., 
2017). Studies on chicks’ cognition, with particular reference to anticipation of forthcoming 
events, in relation to the quality/quantity and the temporal proximity of rewards, are also 
conducted in Japan (Matsushima et al., 2003). 
Young chicks have also been an extraordinary model in the hands of researchers such as 
Art Cherkin (1972), Steven Rose (1993) and Richard Andrew (1991a) to investigate the neural 
bases of memory and memory consolidation using the very simple task of passive aversion after 
a single experience of pecking a bitter tasting pellet. I would like to mention in this regard the 
extraordinary, but little known, finding of Richard Andrew that chicks (perhaps like others 
vertebrates, including humans), show cyclically recurring episodes of successful retrieval in this 
task, with cycle periods that differ in the two hemispheres: coincidence of retrieval episodes in 
both hemispheres seems to allow exchanges of information between different traces maintained 
by the two hemispheres (Andrew, 1991b). 
The different functional specialization of the two hemispheres, brain lateralization, is a 
phenomenon that was until recently thought to be unique to human beings (for reviews see 
Vallortigara and Rogers, 2005; Rogers and Vallortigara, 2015; Vallortigara and Versace, 2017). 
Chickens, together with canaries (Nottebohm, 1971), were the first non-human animals in which 
brain asymmetry was observed. Lesley Rogers, who was the first to observe lateralization of 
function in the chicken’s forebrain (Rogers and Anson, 1979), also discovered that brain 
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asymmetry depends in part on asymmetric light stimulation occurring in the embryo (Rogers, 
1982). Rogers’s studies in chicks opened the way to a huge variety of research on other animal 
models of the environmental and genetic determinants of brain asymmetry (Rogers, 2014; 
Rogers et al., 2013; and see also Rogers, 2017, commentary on Marino’s paper). 
Turning to behavior, it is noteworthy that imprinting has been used as a tool to investigate 
early knowledge, taking advantage of combining rigorous control of past experience (both in ovo 
and soon after hatching) with the possibility of testing very sophisticated cognitive tasks thanks 
to the relative advanced state of motor and sensory development in these precocial animals. 
Using such a tool, naïve physics understanding (Chiandetti and Vallortigara, 2011), Euclidian 
geometry (Chiandetti et al., 2014) and, as stressed in Marino’s review, number cognition (reviews 
in Vallortigara, 2017a,b) have been documented in newborn chicks.  
More recently, imprinting has been used in young chicks and ducklings to study abstract 
thought, such as the concept of same/different (Versace et al., 2006; 2017b; Martinho and 
Kacelnik, 2016) and statistical learning (Santolin et al., 2016). Similarities but also differences 
from the early cognition of humans have been observed (Versace et al., 2016) — the latter being 
no less important to a full understanding of the evolution of the mind. 
 
2. Implications for sentience 
 
Thus, we can only be grateful to Lori Marino for attracting the attention of a large audience to 
the cognitive abilities of chickens. I must confess, however, that I would be skeptical as to 
whether this evidence could be of any help with respect to the issue of animal sentience. I believe 
sentience — which I interpret as the capacity to have felt experience — has little to do with 
advanced cognition. (I suspect that it dates back to early metazoans — and can be present in 
creatures with much simpler brains than those of chickens — but this is of course a topic for 
another commentary or a target article in Animal Sentience; cf. Key, 2016; Klein & Barron, 2016; 
Mallatt & Feinberg, 2016; Woodruff, 2017).  
Indeed, we have no difficulty in attributing a capacity to experience something even to 
members of our own species who, because of some disease, are severely handicapped in their 
cognition; some of them even possibly less cognitively gifted than newborn chicks.  
It is also important to note that there is evidence that sophisticated cognitive feats may be 
accomplished by human subjects without any explicit conscious representation. Consider 
transitive inference, which was mentioned in Marino’s target article. This has been traditionally 
considered a hallmark of human cognition, yet it has been documented in a variety of animals, 
including pigeons (Fersen et al., 1991) and chicks (Daisley et al., 2010). Does this prove that chicks 
are conscious? Not at all, for Sieman and Delius (1993) have shown that some human subjects 
tested with the same kinds of transitive inference tasks used with birds and other non-human 
animals are capable of providing a correct solution without being aware of it, just claiming that 
they are “guessing” (as in a sort of cognitive version of “blindsight,” Pöppel et al., 1973; 
Weiskrantz, 1986). In Sieman and Delius’s words:  
 
“The result worth emphasizing is that almost half (46.7 %) of the subjects who responded 
transitively at much better than chance level were completely unable to report verbally how they 
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had achieved such excellent performance. This demonstrates that humans can behave according 
to deductive rules implicitly without being consciously aware of them.” 
  
This is of course not to deny conscious experience in non-human animals — just to stress that we 
cannot easily infer it from possession of allegedly “higher” cognition. 
Although I agree with Marino that we need to know more about chicken cognition in 
naturalistic settings, I would not recommend to limit research on chicks and chickens to 
noninvasive procedures only. We have learned a lot about how the brain works thanks to these 
creatures, on such crucial topics as memory consolidation, brain asymmetry, critical periods and 
biological predispositions to social life – and the outcomes of this research are as important for 
human health as they are for the health of others animal (including chickens). Of course, all this 
research on chickens (cognitive and neurobiological), as well as on any other non-human animal 
species, should be closely scrutinized and approved by ethical committees. (The current 
standards of the European Community are, in my opinion, very high in this regard.) Even more 
important to me, research should also be guided by the ethical principles of scientists themselves. 
But this should be valid for chickens exactly as for any other animal; they all deserve our respect 
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